nition be resolved in that way. In those cases where the jury is confined to passing on issues where "reasonable men may differ," therefore, the jury is to a considerable degree exercising a policy-declaring or law-making function. In such cases, the jury makes policy in the guise of "finding the facts."
The fact that an important aspect of the jury fact-finding process often consists in the enunciation of policy has significant analytical consequences. Techniques of analysis acquired from legal training and long years spent in presiding over trials, while highly desirable, perhaps essential qualities for deciding purely factual disputes, are not necessarily the most desirable qualities for the exercise of policy-making powers. The inexperience of jurors in resolving formalized factual disputes may frequently be overshadowed by the social importance of having inextricable disputes decided as twelve jurors of the community will decide them. This question is further dealt with below.' 0 The average juror's inexperience in handling disputes may perhaps also be discounted by the inherent nature of the fact-finding process. Eminent psychological opinion can be marshalled in support of the view that complex factual disputes are resolved not so much by a minute weighing of individual testimony as by an over-all impression garnered from viewing the evidence as a whole." To the extent that this, the Gestaltist theory,u is valid, a judgment proceeding from several persons is probably as good or even better than the judgment of one man whose unconscious mental and emotional processes cannot be checked against the reactions of others.The Gestaltist theory currently seems to provide the most sophisticated justification for the familiar common law rule forbidding jurors from taking notes.' 3 However, the force of saying that cases are decided by emotional-intellectual reactions to testimony viewed in its. entirety
10
Infra at page 395.
1 Consult the large number of authorities referred to by Frank, J., in Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 167 F. 2d 54, 69 (C. A. 2d, 1948) . Curtis' formulation of this theory is typical: "[Tihe law quite deliberately throws the jury into as much helpless confusion as it decently cah. For the law has only two choices, and one is impracticable. The law could either ask the jury to make a thorough and complete study and analysis of all the evidence, such as a lawyer does to prepare his argument on appeal. This is impracticable. Or the law could ask the jury to just listen. Any middle ground would be worse than either. For one thing is sure, the evidence has to be taken as a whole, not only all of it, but as a whole, all at one look. So anything short of a thorough restudy of it would be not simply confusing, but misleading." Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra note 9, at 161. 1* While the use of the word "Gestalt" in this connection may be technically inaccurate, it has frequently been employed in literature dealing with the jury to describe the theory noted in the text. It is employed here only as a short-hand method of referring to that theory.
13 See Curtis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 161.
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW rather than by conscious analysis of individual facts cuts heavily into the suggested rationale for the rule requiring unanimous agreement among jurors. "General feelings" about the manner in which a case should be decided are seldom capable of being profitably discussed.
While the merits of the jury as combination fact-finder and declarer of policy may at first blush seem rather substantial, a host of factors incident to the jury's practical operation have combined to insure that this function can at best be performed only with great difficulty. Legal rules, instead of being shaped to ameliorate the effects of the jury's practical weaknesses, seem to have been almost purposefully designed to augment them.' 4 An excellent illustration of the positive steps the law has taken to impede the jury's successful performance of its fact-finding function is furnished by the typical jury selection process." The body of law governing the selection of jurors, rather than recognizing and attempting to reduce the effects of the juror's inexperience in handling legal matters, has instead exempted from service many of the groups who might best be expected to overcome this handicap. 6 Professional men and women are exempted from jury duty in almost every American jurisdiction.' 7 Such exemptions become peculiarly incongruous in the light of the sophisticated nature of the jury's fact-finding function. The importance of having the views of professional persons who are often highly influential in molding community opinion to assist in supplying the element of policy necessary to resolve a dispute seems overwhelming.
The democratic process itself seems designed to insure the legislative exemption of. persons most capable of resolving factual disputes. Jury service often involves heavy economic sacrifices, especially for those persons whose daily incomes are in excess of the per diem pittance meted out 14 See generally, Frank, Courts on Trial 108 et seq. (1949) . 15 See Blume, Jury Selection Analyzed: Proposed Revision of the Federal System, 42 Mich. .L. Rev. 831 (1944) . Consult also, McKelway, Layman's View of Jury Service, 5 F.R. D. 207 (1946) .
16 The Illinois exemption statute is typical: "The following persons shall be exempt from serving as jurors, to wit: The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, Treasurer, Superintendent of .Public Instruction, Attorney General, members of the General Assembly ... all judges... all clerks ... sheriffs, coroners, postmasters, mail carriers, practicing attorneys, all officers of the United States, officiating ministers of the Gospel, school teachers... practicing physicians ... registered pharmacists ... ferrymen, mayors... policemen ... members of the Fire Department, embalmers, undertakers and funeral directors ... and all persons actively employed upon the editorial or mechanical sta ffs and departments of any newspaper;... [and] all legally qualified veterinarians... ." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) [Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY to jurors. It is only natural to expect that groups possessing substantial influence will-utilize it for the purpose of securing legislative exemption. As the groups which can exert such pressures must possess a relatively small membership, the usual result is the exemption of doctors, lawyers, dentists, and educators of every grade and description.' 8 The unattractive economic sacrifices incident to jury service, while in part responsible for the elimination of groups most capable of serving, has an even more undesirable aspect. Persons actively engaged in production who might be expected to possess superior character-gauging and intellectual qualities are the very persons who have an economic stake in inventing excuses sufficient to secure relief from jury duty. 9 And even if they do serve, such persons have a definite economic interest in ending their periods of service as rapidly as possible. Persons suffering large economic sacrifices from jury service have much more to lose from protracted deliberations than their less fortunate colleagues.
The legal rules facilitating the elimination of persons most capable of serving on juries are carried much further than the simple process by which the typical venire is composed. Peremptory challenges, while probably desirable as a means of securing impartial jurors, are also often employed to exclude from the jury anyone "who is particularly experienced in the field of endeavor which is the basis of the law suit." 2 0 Indeed, the use of peremptory challenges for this purpose is recommended by the leading commentaries on trial techniques. 21 Such persons are likely to have too much influence with other jurors. 22 The theory that the least informed are the most capable, however, would seem to be true principally for litigants whose cases are weak and who wish to pull wool over uninformed eyes. The process by which jurors are selected is not the only means through which the jury's fact-finding efficiency is reduced. The surroundings of inquiry during a jury trial contribute heavily to the same end. The mode of presenting evidence is disorderly; interruptions are the rule rather than the exception. And the evidence bearing on a particular issue is not presented all at once, but at two distinct and possibly far removed points in the course of the trial.
The feats of memory required of jurors are prodigious. Applicable legal rules are announced only after and not before the evidence is introduced.
24 So far as the jurors.are concerned, the litigants' competing factual versions are presented in a non-legal vacuum. The successful integration of the facts with the law long after the facts have been presented and many of them forgotten is doubtless often impossible. Inasmuch as the legally crucial and legally unimportant aspects of the evidence are not distinguished until the trial is concluded, the jurors during the trial possess no means of knowing which aspects of the testimony they should particularly concern themselves with. The ultimate outcome of many trials must often depend on evidence which a jury 'considers insignificant until otherwise informed by the court. Instead of remembering the details of that which finally proves to be crucial, the average juror will instead probably recall emotional and dramatic incidents which are legally insignificant. While the tremendous memory burdens imposed upon jurors could readily be lightened by permitting them to take notes, most jurisdictions forbid note-taking.25 Apart from the sophisticated psychological doctrine already noted, 2 6 the common law rule's most forceful justification is that jurors differ in note-taking ability. 27 If the prohibition were removed, efficient note-takers would be in a position to exert a disproportionate influence upon the jury's deliberations . 5 While this justification may have 24 In Indiana, however, the trial judge is obliged to instruct the jury as to the issues for trial, the burden of proof, the credibility of witnesses and the manner of weighing the testimony to be received before counsel are permitted to make their opening statements. 2S Another argument which occasionally appears is that many people place too much value upon the written word. Compare the interesting results found by Hunter in his interrogation 9f jurors: "The lack of attention given to exhibits, such as X-ray pictures, and to the written [Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY possessed some degree of merit when most jurors were unable to read or write, it is currently nonsensical. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would require the exclusion of all jurors of superior mentality. The intelligent juror will almost always exercise more influence than his fellows. 29 This observation considerably undermines the validity of the traditional assumptions concerning juror unanimity and the sacred number "twelve." Even if it is assumed that jurors ordinarily possess the native intellectual ability necessary to absorb and retain vast amounts of factual material, the fullest employment of their faculties is severely impeded by the circumstances under which most trials are conducted.
3 0 The typical trial is surcharged with emotion. The calm essential for dispassionate deliberation and the retention of large amounts of testimony is almost entirely absent. 31 Not only are the factual questions involved in a trial frequently more complex than those with which most jurors are familiar, but, "jurors hear... evidence in a public place, under conditions of a kind to which they are unaccustomed: No juror is able to withdraw to his own room, or office, for private individual reflection. And, at the close of the trial, the jurors are pressed for time in reaching their joint decision. Even twelve experienced judges, deliberating together, would probably not function well under the conditions we impose on the twelve inexperienced laymen.
2
Apart from a few rules such as those preventing the admission of extremely prejudicial evidence, the courts have done little to restrain counsel from awakening the prejudices and arousing the passions of jurymen. In Tennessee, an advocate's right to cry before the jury has been pitched above the constitution, as "one of ... [those] 1, 18 (1935) .
29 See Barnett, Jury's Agreement-Ideal and Real, op. cit. supra note 8. 30 "The parties are keyed up to the contest; and the topics are often calculated to stir up the sympathy, or prejudice; or ridicule of the tribunal.... The longer the trial lasts, the larger the scanning crowds, the more intensely counsel draw the lines of conflict, the more solemn the judge, the harder it becomes for the jury to restrain their reason from somersault." Frank, Courts on Trial 118 (1949) .
31 Compare, however, the extremely high scores which jurors recorded as to facts presented in the courtroom in the studies of Hoffman and Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235 (1952) . This can probably be explained by the fact that a large percentage of the persons involved in the test had received some college training. Compare with the Brodley and Hoffman studies those of Professor Hunter, op. cit. supra note 4. successfully appeal to prejudice, arouse the jurors' passions, and cloud the issues, instead of being pilloried by his associates, is canonized. It is no wonder that the courts look with kindly indulgence upon such rules as those permitting plaintiff's counsel in a paternity suit to parade the sorrowful mother with babe in arms before the jury, or to force the putative father to stand before his peers so that the jury can acertain the purportedly close resemblance between the child's characteristics and his own. 3 7 The toleration bestowed upon counsel's efforts to create sympathy for his client or to engender the jury's prejudice against his opponent is also mirrored in the willingness of "liberal" appellate courts to overlook "mildly inflammatory remarks. ' 38 The willingness of these same courts unhesitatingly to reverse for almost insignificant errors in the trial court's instructions to the jury seems anomalous. While jurors may often be influenced by inflammatory remarks calculated to excite prejudice, it is probably the exceptional case in which a small error in the trial court's instructions influences the jury one way or another.
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The striking degree to which the circumstances surrounding a jury trial differ from those in which jurors resolve factual disputes in private life is again apparent from an examination of the evidential materials upon which jurors rely in arriving at decisions in the two types of situations. While hearsay statements and the opinions of persons whom the juror respects often loom very large in the process leading up to his decisions in private life, the use of both hearsay and opinion in the courtroom is Rev. 199, 204 (1945) . Moffat's questioning of 1500 jurors as to whether they understood the court's instructions resulted in the affirmative responses preponderating over the negative ones in the ratio of about twenty to one.
[Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY sharply restricted. The intricate web of evidential rules governing the receipt of testimony in jury trials seems poorly calculated to take advantage of whatever native decision-making abilities jurors possess.
However, in view of the sophisticated nature of the jury's fact-finding function in many cases, the reply to the contention that jurors can make little use of their native abilities in the courtroom might be that it really doesn't matter. As such questions can by definition reasonably be resolved either way, it is not necessary that jurors possess even average fact-finding abilities.
Several important objections can be urged against such an analysis. First of all, it is only in civil cases that the law confines the jury's factfinding province solely to questions upon which "reasonable men may differ." In criminal cases, the jury is entrusted with all factual questions, whether reasonable men can differ on them or not. And even in civil cases, the necessary consequence of having the jury decide even one issue is to entrust the entire case into its hands. 40 The usual lawsuit involves numerous factual questions.. Although "reasonable men may differ" on how some of these questions may be resolved, there may be little basis for reasonable differences of opinion regarding others. Yet the generally employed practice of either permitting or requiring the jury to return a general verdict renders the court unable to ascertain the precise ground upon which the verdict rests. 4 ' In addition, there are degrees of reasonableness. While experts might agree, for example, that reasonable men could differ as to how a given factual issue should be resolved, there is nevertheless a theoretically correct way to decide every such question. The more rational course for deciding the point seems to dictate the calling of more experts rather than submitting the issue to twelve laymen.
As already noted, 4 2 the second most important justification of the view that the jurors' fact-finding abilities are immaterial is the theory'that factual analysis is useless anyway and that the outcome of lawsuits principally depends upon the jurors' simple reactions to the evidence viewed in its entirety. If this contention is correct, the jury's verdict in many cases must be contrary to the law as declared in the instructions of the court. The Gestaltist theory of the decisional process assumes that a verdict will be returned for the litigant who appears best entitled to victory on the basis of the testimony as a whole, with no regard for particular aspects of the case. 43 In a negligence action, for example, although the plaintiff may have established beyond question that the defendant was negligent and is clearly entitled to a verdict on the basis of the evidence considered as a whole, on the issue of contributory negligence the plaintiff's case might just barely be strong enough.to avoid a directed verdict for the defendant. Yet on the theory that a factual analysis of the testimony is immaterial, the Gestalt theory would require that a verdict be directedfor the plaintiff. Logically extended, the "snapshot theory" of the decisional process necessitates eliminating the jury in all cases where reasonable men could not differ about which party satisfied the Gestaltist-burden of showing that most of the factual disputes should be resolved in his favor. Furthermore, the Gestaltist doctrine ignores the jury's legal duty to decide factual disputes in accordance with law, and negates the theory that the jury rationally declares policy in the guise of finding facts. Rational balancing of conflicting community policies is impossible if a verdict must in any event be returned for the litigant who satisfies the burden of showing that most of the evidence is slanted in his favor.
In view of the jury selection process and the vastly difficult conditions under which jurors labor, the theory that most jurors can correctly apply involved legal rules to complicated factual disputes, disregarding all testimony erroneously admitted, and in all other respects obey the court's instructions seems highly suspect. 44 In many cases jurors will probably not even understand the legal rules announced by the court. Even lawyers cannot always accurately comprehend them. As Judge Jerome Frank has pointed out:
To comprehend the meaning of many a legal rule requires special training. It is inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men... could, merely from listening to the instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge necessary to grasp the true import of the judge's words. For these words have often acquired their meaning as the result of hundreds of years of professional disputation in the courts. The jurors usually are as unlikely to get the meaning of those words as if they were spoken in Chinese, Safiskrit, or Choctaw. 45 In numerous ways the courts appear to have recognized this. The development of legal rules governing motions for a new trial, the directed verdict, as well as demurrers to the pleadings and evidence bear too close a connection with the evolution of the modem jury trial to be pure historical [Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY accidents. 4 All of these doctrines are merely mechanisms for transferring the burden of decision from the jury to the court, thus 'avoiding the risk that the jury will err in cases where the evidence is clearly all on one side. The flowering of various per se liability rules can be similarly explained. 47 Many of the doctrines governing the admission of evidence amply reflect the low esteem in which courts have traditionally held the average juror's fact-finding abilities. 48 Particularly is this true in such areas as relevance and materiality, where evidence, if admitted, is likely to create an unjustifiable prejudice or confuse the issues. While some doubt has been cast on the thesis that the inception of evidentiary rules in most cases corresponds with the emergence of the jury as an established factfinding body, 49 the continued vitality of the jury is certainly the principal justification for their retention today.
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But the assumption of evidence law that the jury is ill-equipped to decide factual disputes is not consistently maintained. Thus, "[it] often happens.., that an item of testimony will have a highly and illegitimately prejudicial effect upon one issue and a substantial, legitimately logical value upon another. The court then, with an inconsistency born of necessity, assumes that the jury which has not sufficient capacity to make the necessary discriminations upon the first issue has the ability to perform the psychological feat of disregarding the item entirely upon the first issue and of confining its influence to the second issue." 51 4s See the excellent discussion in Green, Judge and Jury 375-94 (1930).
47 E.g., the familiar Pennsylvania stop-look-and-listen rule which requires a directed verdict for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to stop at a railroad crossing. See text and notes at page 407 infra. 48 See generally, Morgan, The jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 247 (1936) .
4' Compare Morgan: "Our exclusionary rules of evidence are the resultant of several factors. Ancient ideas as to the reliability of witnesses have had their influence. Judicial convictions that the privilege of suppressing the truth is essential to the fostering of certain socially desirable relationships and to the protection of the citizen from persecution have played a large part. The adversary theory of litigation is directly responsible for many of them; and judicial distrust of the jury for not a few; but the dictum... that the English law of evidence is 'the child of the jury' is... not more than a half-truth." Morgan, op. cit. supra note 48, at 258.
50 The most important qualification to this statement would seem to lie in the area of testimonial privileges.
61 Morgan, op. cit. supra note 48, at 249. Alternating judicial regard for and distrust of the jury's abilities is apparent elsewhere than in the law of evidence. The vast feats of memory required of jurors, the highly-refined assumption that the jury can analyze and correctly apply complex legal instructions and the jury's duty to resolve knotty factual disputes are totally inconsistent with such rules as those prohibiting the court from commenting upon the evidence for fear that the jury will be too much influenced. A recent federal case, Butler v. United States, 188 F. 2d 24 (App. D.C., 1951), reversed the trial judge for failure to instruct the jury that the court's facial expressions during the trial were not to be considered. See Note, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Finally, if society regarded jurors as more capable fact-finders than trial judges, we should expect that the numerous exceptions to the right of trial by jury would not have arisen. In this respect, there is little excuse for distinctions so subtle as that between a fraud action for damages and an action for recision in equity based upon the same facts.
A brief appraisal of the consequences which have resulted from the jury's function as finder of facts gives added perspective from which to view the success which the jury has exhibited in this capacity. These consequences are profound.
While the jury cannot be charged with responsibility for necessitating the troublesome distinction between questions of fact and law, it has certainly heightened the significance of the distinction. The social quest for legal rules adapted as guides to future conduct, coupled with the laymen's total lack of understanding in legal affairs, must early have given rise to the practice of judicial instructions concerning the law. While it was for the jury to decide "pure questions of fact," it was the province of the court to advise the jury on "matters of law." The judicial practice of instructing the jury on matters of law has probably been the most fruitful, source of error in our jurisprudence.
5 2 As already noted, appellate courts have displayed a strange fear that jurors will be misled by instructions which the courts in other connections seem to recognize that many jurors probably cannot even understand.
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In addition to errors in the court's instructions to the jury, the distinction between law and fact may result in the submission of a question to the jury which an appellate court later decides was a question of law for the court. 5 4 Whatever service the jury performs as a convenient device for
Criminal Procedure, Facial Expressions and Gesticulations of Trial Judge, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 236 (1952) . The greatest inconsistency of them all, however, is presented by the case of Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465,3 S.W. 824 (1887) . The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the trial court, in a negligence case, for instructing the jury that due care "was just such care as one of you, similarly employed, would have exercised," as it didn't appear that the jurors were men of ordinary care. Ibid., at 474 and 827. [Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY separating factual and legal questions (thus preventing future cases involving different facts from being governed by a combined set of legal and factual determinations valid only for the case in which they were first employed),m seems outweighed by the deleterious effects produced by frequent disputes concerning the scope of legal and factual questions and by the jury's fact-finding difficulties in general.
Erroneous comments on the evidence, 5 6 and irrelevant, inflammatory, or prejudicial remarks of counsel or court are additional sources of error stemming from the jury's fact-finding function.
5 7 Evidential errors furnish an even more frequent cause for reversal; and are, indeed, often the only means by which an appellate court can overturn a verdict which has a reasonable basis in the evidence, but which the court feels morally certain is in error.-
8
The well-intrenched distinction between law and equity can in some measure also be ascribed to the jury. The numerous cases dealing with the proper scope of appellate review would long ago have ceased to have meaning had litigants not been permitted the opportunity of wrangling over the right to a jury trial.
5 9 Procedural errors resulting from uncertainty as to when jury trials may be obtained under merged procedure afford an additional cause for expense and delay.
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Another chief consequence of the litigants' right to a jury trial is seen in the effects produced upon the courts' willingness to utilize modern sci---While not previously emphasized, the use of the jury for the purpose of separating questions of law and fact has also been urged as one of the jury's less important functions. Dickinson, however, has assigned it pre-eminence. Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1052 Rev. -53 (1931 . It must be admitted that combined legal and factual determinations by equity courts and by law courts sitting without juries have sometimes worked injustices. But such instances have been comparatively infrequent. Consult Chafee, Simpson, and Maloney, Cases on Equity 1058-59 (1951). 7 Jury waiver problems occasion an additional source of error. See Note, 59 Yale L. J. 345, 346 et seq. (1950) .
68 The numerous devices which have been created to take questions from the jury, such as demurrers to the pleadings or evidence and the directed verdict also occasion frequent grounds for delay. Errors in the impaneling of the jury should also be mentioned. entific techniques."' Fearing the undue weight which the average juror might attach to these techniques, the courts have eiher severely restricted their use or prohibited them from being used altogether. 2 As the evidential rules governing the receipt of scientific testimony have been carried over to cases at law tried without juries, and to cases in equity, the result has been to stultify considerably the over-all sophistication of judicial inquiry. And even where such techniques are admitted as evidence, the degree of conclusiveness which science attaches to them has often been ignored. 63 Oddly enough, courts which greatly restrict the use of many kinds of scientific techniques for fear of the jury's inability to accord them proper weight, also frequently assume that jurors possess sufficient technical ability to detect error in the most complicated scientific experiment. The attitude of the California court in the case of Berry v. Chaplin, 6 4 permitting the jury to return a verdict in the face of uncontroverted and unimpeached scientific testimony that the defendant could not have been the father of the plaintiff's child, is typical of many tribunals.-The rationale of such decisions rests on the assumption that the jury must have "felt" there was error in the conduct of the experiment. Concededly, however, disregard of scientific facts has not always been confined to juries.
66
The crudity of legal administration necessitated by the jury is exemplified in rules other than those governing the admissibility of scientific techniques.
6 7 A significant portion of the evidential doctrines restricting or precluding the rational use of lay and expert opinion testimony can also be ascribed to the jury. 68 The familiar rubric concerning illicit invasions of the jury's fact-finding province, on the ultimate issues and otherwise, furnishe the most frequently expressed basis for such doctrines. 69 Judicial skepticism of the jury is also mirrored in the well-established doctrine that life-expectancy and annuity tables are to be employed only with great caution, if at all."h The Pennsylvania court has refused to sanction the use of annuity tables by the jury under any circumstances, remarking that, "The less jurors are burdened with complicated tables and the necessity for complex calculations, the more likely will they be to do substantial justice."'7 And even where such tables are admitted, the jury's discretion is safeguarded unless clearly erroneous. 72 Particularly is this true of cases arising under wrongful death statutes. 73 Rules pertaining to the use of statistical aids in determining damages, however, are merely one aspect of the widespread influence of the jury in the shaping of damage law. 74 In many cases, the jury's inability to do anything but speculate on the amount of the plaintiff's damages results in a complete denial of recovery, despite the fact that valid statistical means of estimating them exist. 74 To mention only one example, rulings which exclude evidence of business profits designed t6 establish the value of plaintiff's working time rest almost entirely on judicial fear of swollen verdicts. Ibid., at 312. 7This has been particularly true where the nature of the interest injured is highly ephemeral, such as a "chance" or a "mere expectancy." McCormick, Damages 120 et seq. (1935).
7"Awards for similar injuries, age and income considered, are widely variant in amount, even where there is no real contest over liability and consequently no attempt to compromise liability and amount." Ibid., at 306-7. THE UNIVERSIrY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 77 Holmes declared that as the legal question of whether "bank-nite" was a lottery had been determined in the affirmative by a jury in the earlier case of Commonwealth v. Wright, it was "not necessary to go on forever taking the opinion of the jury," but that the jury's verdict in the Wright case had finally determined the question. 78 The power to create precedents, long thought to be an exclusively judicial function, was thus placed within the province of the jury as well as the court.
But the Holmesian view concerning the proper scope of the jury's lawmaking function, however influential in jurisprudential theory, has not prevailed in the courtroom. The Holmes' opinion in Commonwealth v. Sullivan excepted, no case has been uncovered in which a court has shown itself willing to share stare decisis powers with a body of twelve laymen. The resolution of statutory ambiguities for the purpose of providing legal standards to guide future adjudication has remained a strictly judicial function.
While the jury tradition has not as yet engulfed the courts' stare decisis powers, the jury has, in a variety of contexts, been charged with the duty of declaring law for particular cases. Three questions must be carefully distinguished: (1) the jury's duty to declare the law in opposition to what the trial judge says the law is; (2) the jury's duty to decide, pursuant to legal standards laid down by the court, whether a given type of conduct or group of events falls within a legal rule; and (3) the jury's duty to inject an element of community sentiment into its resolution of issues upon which reasonable men may differ. The third of these questions hav-"ng already been discussed 7 9 only the first and second remain for consideration. N As late as 1794, in the case of Georgia v. Brailsford, 0 Chief Justice Jay was stating that the jury's functions in civil cases encompassed the duty; of disregarding the court's instructions on the law if the jury felt them to be erroneous. Several other early American cases support a similar doctrine. 81 Indeed, in the period following the Revolutionary War, the jury's duty to ignore whatever legal rules it felt were unjustified was considered [Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY of such importance in Georgia that it was constitutionally safeguarded.
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So far as civil cases are concerned, however, this aspect of jury supremacy over the law has completely disappeared and it is everywhere settled that the jury must in civil cases take the law as the court's instructions direct.
In criminal cases, recognition afforded the jury's duty to decide the law in opposition to the stated views of the trial court has been much more widespread.
8s In several states, explicit constitutional provisions were adopted to safeguard it. 8 4 In Illinois, for example, the constitution was thought to permit counsel to argue judicial opinions before the jury as late as 1 93 1 ,85 By a gradual process of judicial emasculation, however, state constitutional provisions empowering the jury in criminal cases to decide legal questions have been rendered meaningless. The formerly well-entrenched criminal law notion that the jury is rightfully entitled to disregard the law as given in the court's instructions has now been repudiated in all states but Indiana and Maryland. 8 The question of whether the jury could legally disregard the instructions of the court was at last conclusively settled for the federal system in the case of Sparf and Hansen v. United 'States. 7 The majority of the Court, by Justice Harlan, held that the jury is bound, in criminal as well as civil cases, to follow the judge's instructions upon all matters of law. Justice Gray, with Justice Shiras concurring, vigorously dissented in a seventy-three page opinion.
8 While the major portion of both opinions is superficially concerned with a disposition of prior cases, the crucial issue, certainly for the majority, was whether it could be admitted that the jury had the right to dispense with the operation of law in particular cases and, in effect, to declare statutes unconstitutional. In several glowing rhetorical passages which can easily be read as an elevation of stare decisis prin-1 Ga, Const. Art. XLI (1777). 83 The constitutional provisions and cases are collected in an excellent article by Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 582, 589 (1939) . " An Illinois statute, passed pursuant to a constitutional provision of 1818, long interpreted to give counsel the right to argue questions of law before a jury, was finally declared unconstitutional in 1931. People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931) . The highly specious nature of the majority's reasoning is well pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice Duncan. Ibid., at 167 and 408. Compare Commonwealth v. Austin, 7 Gray (Mass.) 51 (1856), and Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 274 Mass. 315, 174 N.E. 665 (1931) .
6 See Lynch v. State, 9 Ind. 541 (1857); Wheeler v. State, 42 Md. 563 (1875). However, it seems clear from later decisions in both jurisdictions that the position taken in these early cases-is continually being eaten away. Howe, op. cit. supra note 83, at 614 n. 126. 
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ciples to the level of constitutional law, 89 the Court spoke eloquently of the need for uniformity of statutory interpretation and administration, for a government of law and not of men, for legal signposts lighting the way for future adjudication as contrasted with the hit-or-miss blackness of the jury's general verdict on the law. For Justice Gray, 90 the issue was liberty against uniformity, the need for flexibility as opposed to the mechanical desire of the majority to place everyone on the same administrative level. Both Harlan and Gray conceded the power of the jury to suspend the law; they differed over the jury's right to do it. Jerome Frank 91 and others have argued that no practical distinction can be drawn between jury power and jury right. But this implies that the distinction is meaningless. Actually, the practical implications of justice Gray's position are profound. 'An admission by the nation's highest Court that twelve laymen are more capable of deciding law than trial judges would probably have led to a-drastic modification of the jury system. In an important sense, therefore, the real friend of the jury was not Gray, but Harlan. The position of the majority in Sparf and Hansen, that uniformity of adjudication is superior to flexibility in individual cases, is in striking analytical contrast to the universally recognized function of the jury to decide, pursuant to legal standards laid down by the court, whether a certain type of conduct or group of events falls within a given legal definition. A consistent application of the "government by law" rationale constituting the basis for the Sparf ruling seems to require that the jury be deprived of the right to decide questions of law under all circumstances.
9
" Theoretically, of course, the "government by law" principle is not necessarily opposed to current practice. The jury can be conceived of as deciding in accordance with law because it is the law that the jury should decide what the law is. Practically, however, different juries must frequently decide law differently and uniformity in the administration of justice becomes impossible. General verdicts are not stare decisis; no records are even kept of them. (1949) . 92 Entrusting the jury with the decision of legal questions runs counter to our entire tradition and to many of our deep seated legal rules, such as the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses, the constitutional prohibition on vaguely drawn statutes, and the ejusdem generis limitation of catch-all provisions.
,3 "Jury-made law, as compared with judge-made law, is peculiar in form. It does not issue general pronouncements. You will not find it set forth in the law reports or in textbooks. It does not become embodied in a series of precedents. It is nowhere codified. For each jury makes its own law in each case with little or no knowledge of or reference to what has been done before or regard to what will be done thereafter in similar cases." Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 173-74 n. t (1930) .
The determination of whether certain conduct falls within a particular legal category has frequently been left to the jury on the theory that such a determination involves a "mixed question of law and fact. '9 4 In one sense, at least, all such questions are "mixed questions of law and fact." 5 Yet in a very large number of cases, the fitting of facts into a legal rule is held to involve a "pure question of law." 96 Thus, the question raised by a demurrer to an indictment in an ordinary criminal case on the ground that the facts alleged do not charge an offense is the same type of question as that involved in determining whether a book is obscene or whether a defendant acted as a reasonably prudent man. On demurrer, all three cases raise the issue of whether certain conceded facts fall within a general rule of law. Yet the first of these issues is everywhere held to be a "pure question of law," while the latter two issues are denominated "mixed questions of law and fact." 9 7 It is apparent that the use of such labels is merely a convenient method of characterizing which of such questions are for the court and which are for the jury.
That the phrase "mixed question of law and fact" represents a mere legal conclusion, however, does "not detract from the significance of the consequences resulting from its use. When a court characterizes an issue as involving a "mixed question of law and fact" it is almost universally sent to the jury and, more important, cannot be taken from the jury if reasonable men can differ on how it should be resolved.
The most familiar example of a "mixed question of law and fact" con- 15 Thus, the question of whether certain facts fit within a given legal category is certainly as much a fact as whether the defendant shot X. An "issue of law" is also involved, as the question of what consequences flow from certain conceded facts necessarily involves a question of law.
The line demarcating questions of law for the court from combined questions of law and fact which are for the jury has never been clear. The most plausible rationale governing the distinction seems to hinge upon a question's relative importance. If the court feels that a question decisively affects some crucial public interest, the court itself will decide it. This perhaps explains the inconsistency that the question of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action is for the court to determine, although it seems much the same as the question of "due care" left to the jury in negligence cases. The reason for the malicious prosecution rule is the danger that juries might reach verdicts which would deter people from volunteering information concerning suspected criminals. sists in the jury's determination in negligence cases of whether a defendant has acted reasonably.
8 While the question of whether the defendant acted reasonably is a "question of fact" in the sense that he either did or did not perform certain acts which a prudent man would have performed, it also involves a "question of law." For to determine what a prudent man would have done is to define particularly the legal standard which the defendant's conduct must meet in order to avert liability for negligence. When the jury decides whether the defendant acted reasonably, it is not deciding a "pure question of fact," such as whether a dog drowned or the defendant struck Brown. Of course, preliminary questions concerning the existence of a legal duty on the part of the defendant to act reasonably toward the plaintiff and whether reasonable men could differ on whether this legal duty was violated are questions for the court. 9 9 It is also the court's function to instruct the jury on the nature of the defendant's legal duty in general; the defendant should have acted as a reasonably prudent man considering all of the circumstances under which the accident took place. But it is for the jury rather than the court to say.what was reasonable under the circumstances, and to fit into the court's general definition the facts of a particular case. The Pennsylvania stop-look-and-listen rule furnishes perhaps the most familiar illustration of a judicially prescribed standard of reasonableness for a particular situation. 1 0 3 Regardless of unusual circumstances, such as visual obstructions, rain, snow, or fog, or even an actual invitation to cross, the plaintiff's failure to stop before crossing a railroad track is negligence per se.1 0 4 The rule "is not a rule of evidence, but a rule of law, peremptory, absolute and unbending; and the jury can never be permitted to ignore it, to evade it or to pare it away by distinctions and exceptions." 05 Numerous other examples of judicially created rules governing particular situations could also be mentioned. 0 6 Their vitality, however, is on the wane1 0 7
and they have always been exceptions to the normal rule that the particular standard of reasonableness is a question for the jury. The principal argument favoring a judicial particularization of legal rules in negligence cases is the added predictability which would result from taking such questions from the jury. 08 Currently, the only instance in which the court is legally empowered to formulate a particularized standard of conduct is.where reasonable men could not differ regarding its correctness. If the courts were always required to determine the precise legal nature of the defendant's conduct, negligence law would be much more predictable. Whatever injustice may exist under current practice, however, is said to be justified by the fact that defendants can be negligent in a vast number of ways, and that stare decisis codification of particularized rules is impossible. A corollary of this notion is that codification would produce more injustice than it would alleviate. It is doubtful ... is familiar. It... must be preserved if jury trial is to be preserved." Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 556, 62 N.E. 2d 840, 847 (1945) . While this statement is drawn from a case involving an obscenity prosecution rather than a negligence case, the principle involved is the same.
10 3 E.g., Pennsylvania R. whether these arguments alone are powerful enough to counter-balance the undesirable effects of the uncertainty resulting from the submission of such questions to the jury. A more decisive consideration, however, is that most negligence actions arise out of factual settings in which the nonexistence of precedents concerning reasonableness is immaterial. It is an extraordinary individual who. consults a lawyer before deciding to drive in excess of a given' speed, or before making a left-hand turn without signaling properly. Yet the reasons justifying the practice of submitting the negligence issue to a jury in civil cases are probably insufficient to justify a similar practice in criminal negligence actions. Not only is there a greater need for predictability in criminal cases, but the pressing necessity of administering justice even-handedly between two similarly situated and equally culpable defendants applies with much greater force in criminal cases.
The lack of predictability resulting from the practice of entrusting "mixed questions of law and fact" to the jury is not confined to the law of criminal negligence. Indeed, the practice seems unjustified in any instance where the social policies underlying the need for predicitability and equality before the law overshadow the difficulties attendant upon the formulation of particularized legal rules. In the resolution of constitutional questions, for example, the need for predictability is paramount. Yet there are currently a large number of combined legal and factual determinations in this area which are left to the jury. In a recent Maryland case, 09 for example, the jury was permitted to determine whether the plaintiff was denied the equal protection of the laws because of an alleged inadequacy of Negro as contrasted with white public golf facilities. So far as third parties are concerned, of course, the general verdict which resulted left the question as unsettled as before the litigation began. Other equally unjustified examples of the above practice are afforded by the submission to the jury of the "just rate" 110 and "just compensation"" ' issues involved in public utility and eminent domain litigation. Only last term the Court sustained the New York practice of leaving the question of whether a confession is voluntary to the jury,1 even though the effect of the practice is virtually to deprive defendants of any independent determination of the voluntariness issue whatever. The mixed legal and factual question involved in determining whether a statute is "reasonable" has also occasionally been left Currently, however, the practice of entrusting mixed questions of law and fact to the jury has worked its most unfavorable effects in the law of free speech. The doctrine that First Amendment rights are particularly worthy of protection," 5 and that all attempts to infringe upon them must .pass the most rigid judicial scrutiny would seem to require that such questions be kept from the jury at all costs. Actually, however, the exact opposite is true. In an obscenity case, for example, the issue of a book's obscene character is generally held to be a question for the jury. And, because a "mixed question of law and fact" is said to be involved, the question raised by the defendant's demurrer on the ground of the indictment's failure to state an offense is not whether the book is obscene, but whether twelve jurors could reasonably differ on its obscene character." 6 As already noted, however, the question raised by the defendant's demurrer in an ordinary criminal case is held to involve a "pure question of law." Thus, if A is indicated. for an attempted murder and it is alleged as constituting such an attempt that A purchased a gun with the intent to shoot X, on A's demurrer the court would determine, not whether reasonable men could differ as to whether these acts constituted an attempt, but whether they do so as a matter of law. S. 210, 227 (1908) .
In few areas of the law is legal certainty more at a premium than in the area where federal and state authority dovetails and lawyers, on the pain of losing everything for their clients, are required to pick the correct statute under which to bring an action. Yet, even here, the courts have held that where the facts are in dispute or where more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from undisputed facts, the question of whether an employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of an accident, so as to enjoy the protection of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, is a question for the jury. Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N.E. 2d 57 (1944); Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239 U.S. 50 (1915) . Indeed, in the Pennsylvania case, the Court characterized the opposing view as "frivolous." Ibid., at 51.
of See the discussion and citation of authorities in United States Supreme Court's Rules of'Self-Limitation as Applied to the Fundamental Rights of the First Amendment, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 390 (1949) .
116 Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d 840 (1945) ; United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 564"(C. A. 2d, 1930); People v. Pesky, 254 N.Y. 373, 173 N.E. 227 (1930) . See also, People v. Seltzer, 122 Misc. 329, 203 N.Y. Supp. 809 (S. Ct., 1924) . See, e.g., People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927); People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906) Cases involving negligence, obscenity, libel, slander, indecency, and certain types of political free speech are the principal instances in which the jury has been given the right to decide law, even for particular cases. The negligence exception to the rule that legal questions are solely for the 118 As Judge Learned Hand puts it, "the verdict of the jury is not the conclusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor premise, but really a small bit of legislation ad hoc." United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 157 (C.A. 2d, 1936) .
While there are at least three and possibly four views concerning the legal definition of obscenity, all of them involve an implied finding by the jury of the prevailing standards of community morality. See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40 et seq. (1938) .
"9 "Whether the printed words would in fact produce as a proximate result a material interference with the recruiting or enlistment service ... 
1954]
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY court can perhaps be rationalized." 4 The other exceptions cannot be. The practical effect of submitting these questions to the jury is to deprive groups such as authors, playwrights and political reformers of legal standards by which to guide their conduct. Libel, slander, obscenity and political free speech situations would seem to require, because of their very "amorphousness," a higher degree of "advance legal notice" than any other kind of case. Legal rules here, if anywhere, are essential to government by law.125
III. THE JURY AS LAW DISPENSER
The power of the jury to dispense with the operation of law in particular cases has often been heralded as its greatest function . 8 The flexibility of administration made possible by the general verdict is said to render otherwise impersonal legal rules human and to supply the needed filling out of the exceptions necessarily left unprovided for in any rational legal system.u 7 The law-dispensing function of the jury also makes gradual change possible and is .an expediter in the implementation of community sentiment . 2 Jury verdicts permit laws to anticipate the democratic proc-M' It must be admitted, however, that the distinction taken in the text between the jury's law-making duties in negligence as contrasted with obscenity cases has not been recognized. See, e.g., the remarks of Hand, J., in United States v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156, 157 (C.A. 2d, 1936) , in which the jury's law-making function in negligence and obscenity cases is said to be the same.
Im Judicial willingness in recognizing the importance of according to defendants reasonable notice of what the law is in ordinary criminal cases, when the question of an indictment's legal sufficiency is for the court, is nowhere better illustrated than in the relaxation of the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" whenever the law is so uncertain that the defendant could not possibly have known what it was. See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1393 Rev. (1949 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 364-72 (1947) . Why this consideration has not had influence in cases where legal questions are left to the jury is nowhere explained. Holmes is not speaking of the jury's strictly legal function as fact-finder, in which the law has accorded the jury ample room for injecting community sentiment into issues upon which reasonable men may differ. He is instead praising jury lawlessness, the process by which juries nullify laws although the facts on which their de facto legal determinations are based are ones upon which reasonable men could not differ. These two questions are entirely different.
11S The more sophisticated advocates of jury lawlessness pose anarchy as the alternative to a general verdict: "There is a.. . 'socially adapted intuitive law'-which evolves in the various ess. While the fiction of stability is maintained until the legislature can act, the law is enabled to move ahead by dispensing with itself.' 9 Several observations can be made concerning the jury's law-dispensing function. In the first place, we do not know how well it works; the verdict is a seal of secrecy which the law has thus far refused to open. While it is generally recognized that juries often return verdicts contrary to law, we cannot be sure whether this results from conscious law-dispensing or pure bungling. For many juries, the conscientious application of the court's instructions to the facts may result in an unconscious dispensing with the law.'
30 Juries themselves do not always know what they are doing. 31 Furthermore, exceptions to the ordinary legal rules work both ways. Persons who look with favor upon the jury's legislative powers generally think only one way, of the murder case, for example, where the defendant shot his wife's paramour in a fit of blind rage, or where the community's most able and God-fearing doctor administered poison to put his best friend out of misery. Where the prejudices of the community are shrouded in the verdict's mystery to carve out an exception from a rule whose normal operation would permit the defendant to go free, law-dispensing becomes less palatable. The bona-fide white male conviction of a Negro for leering at a white girl at a distance of over sixty feet is a Southern exception to the ordinary assault rule. 32 Other examples must be legion; the whitewashing of lynchers is also law-dispensing. In addition to being an inconsistent law-dispenser, the jury is in many communities to which we belong.... [Elach has its own rules of conduct.... The positive law proclaimed by the state cannot do violence to the law-consciousness of the people without creating serious tensions in society." Berman, The Challenge of Soviet Law, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 220, 449-51 (1949) .
129 Judge Wyzanski puts this notion forward as an excuse for trial judge failure adequately to instruct the jury upon the law, and to lecture against allowing emotional considerations to enter into the deliberations. As the jurist says, "[J]udges sense a new climate of public opinion which rates security as one of the chief goals of men." Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, op. cit. supra note 126, at 1285-86. 12 Chicago Sun Times, p. 19, col. 1-2 (Nov. 12, 1952). On appeal, the judgment was reversed because a man cannot be convicted of an assault merely "for what may have been in his mind." State v. Ingram, 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E. 2d 532 (1953) . In reversing the judgment, the Court noted that, "A careful observance . . . of the ... statute regulating the compilation of jury lists and prescribing the sources of information to aid in determining the qualifications of those listed would do much to improve the quality of juries." Ibid., at 204 and 537.
[Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY respects a highly unrepresentative one.
133 If the jury is designed to function as a minor legislature, it should represent a total cross-section of the community.
3 4 The fact is, of course, that democratic processes cannot always produce changes which juries have effected. In many cases, no person would vote for the abolition of a law which he might readily ignore in his capacity as juror. In other cases, of course, we may predict with more or less certainty that the legislature will ultimately effectuate the changes juries have sought to implement. Familiar examples are found in the largely outmoded fellow-servant rule, and in the doctrine of contributory negligence. It is probable, however, that the legal remains of these doctrines would long ago have passed out of our law had not the jury made their presence less disturbing. Instead of facilitating desirable changes in the law, jury verdicts may in many cases retard such changes. Meanwhile, juries are permitted to deal differently with persons who are similarly situated. The long hours lawyers spend in assembling juries is ample evidence of this. The incidence of typical jury room legislation has probably, in the long run, benefited comparatively few. The most telling objection which can be urged against the exercise of the jury's power to dispense with the law, however, is that it is contrary to law and to the "government by law" principle. Men who act arbitrarily all too frequently act unjustly. And it makes little sense to tell jurors to follow the law, while hoping and recognizing that they will disobey it anyway. . . fact... is that the jury has never been regarded as a purely democratic institution.... It is common knowledge that in all ... states many people who vote... are nevertheless deprived of the privilege of serving on juries. For the most part, a voter... need only show that he is 21 ... a citizen, and not in jail, whereas a juryman may have to be 25 years of age, the owner of property, of good character, intelligent, and fairly well-skilled. Moreover, in many states a commissioner of jurors or a county clerk has almost unlimited discretion to determine which persons meet the requirements.... ." Baker, In Defense of the 'Blue Ribbon ' Jury, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 409, 415-16 (1950) (collecting statutes and representative cases).
13
4 The jury, when functioning as law-dispenser, would thus be at odds with'itself as capable finder of facts. Persons drawn at random from the entire community cannot be expected to meet the rigid intellectual requirements necessitated by the jury trial process. The more efficient the jury, ordinarily at least, the more unrepresentative. See Baker, op. cit. supra note 133, at 417. The New York Blue Ribbon juries, while far more "efficient" in the sense of convicting many more people, are scarcely drawn from the slums. See Comment, Blue Ribbon Juries, 47 Col. L. Rev. 463. (1947) . 13 The theory that the jury acts as law-dispenser is wholly inconsistent with the innumerable cases reversing trial courts for failing properly to instruct juries on legal principles. In another respect, however, the law-dispensing theory and reversals for improper instructions are consistent, as both assume that jurors understand the judge's instructions. flection of the close historical identification of the jury with freedom. More probably it is a result of the wide-spread feeling that the jury is more effective in criminal proceedings and that an accused is entitled to the best democracy can offer him. A third possible explanation is similar to the second but diametrically opposed to it. This is the theory that democracy's best is efficiency's worst and that criminal juries are worshipped for their aberrations because we are all potential criminals.
. Probably no one of these three theories is entirely correct nor altogether wrong. Historically, of course, the traditional association of the criminal jury trial with freedom is erroneous. The jury originated as a purely administrative device designed to extend the power of a dictatorial monarchy. 3 ' Only centuries later did it become the basis of a rebellion against absolutism. 1 3 7 But the criminal jury's function as a protector of the individual against government is anomalous in far more than a simple historical sense. So long as the balance of power between government and the people rests with the former, twelve commoners of the vicinage can be expected to shield individuals fighting against government oppression. But when the balance of power is reversed, instead of opposing the government's attempted oppressions, jurors are more likely to favor them. From the time of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the government's attempted inroads on civil rights seem to have received the enthusiastic support of jurors. 38 As Judge Amidon remarked after extensive experience with Espionage Act prosecutions during the First World War:
Only those who have administered the Espionage Act can understand the danger of such legislation.... Most of the jurymen have sons in the war. They are all under the power of the passions which war engenders. For the first six months after June 15, 1917, I tried war cases before jurymen who were candid, sober, intelligent business men, whom I had known for thirty years, and who under ordinary circumstances would have had the highest respect for my declarations of law, but during that period they looked back into my eyes with the savagery of wild animals, saying by their manner, "Away with this twiddling, let us get at him." Men believed during that period that the only verdict in a war case, which could show loyalty, was a verdict of guilty.' 3 9
136 Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 1-138 (1875).
37 Ibid.
138 As Chafee points out, "The transference of... censorship from the judge to the jury is indeed important when the attack on the government which is prosecuted expresses a widespread popular sentiment, but the right to jury trial is of much less value in times of war or threatened disorder when the herd instinct runs strong, if the opinion of the defendant is highly objectionable to the majority of the population, or even to the particular class of men from whom or by whom the jury are drawn." Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 24 (1948); see also, Worts, "The Jury System" under Changing Social Conditions, 47 Am. L. Rev. 67 (1931) .
139 Chafee, op. cit. supra note 138 at 70.
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Judge Amidon's experience has been mirrored in every period of panic and popular indignation from earliest times down to the present. 140 But the case against the criminal jury as a protector of individual liberty extends further than to contests between government and citizens opposed to its policies. Minority groups have often suffered at the hands of jurymen. Wholesale acquittals of lynch-law violators, convictions of Negroes on the slightest evidence, and numerous other occurrences which have now almost become a part of the jury tradition might be instanced as examples.
The jury in criminal cases has another perhaps equally unpalatable aspect. In a democratic society, it is a definite obstacle to reform and innovation. As jurors will usually reflect the opinions of a majority of the community, so long as the majority itself remains unconvinced of the attempted reform's wisdom, juries will usually reflect a similar sentiment. Thus, artistic innovations have often been thwarted. In a few jurisdictions, obscenity convictions have been obtained for writing and publishing some of America's best literature.
141 Writers and producers of the finest modem stage plays have often suffered similarly.'4
Aside from the incidental psychological functions which the criminal jury is alleged to perform, the sole remaining virtue claimed for it lies in its ability to make allowances for the circumstances of the particular case -to dispense with a rule of law. As noted previously, however, law-dispensing is a two-edged sword, and there is no current means of ascertaining which way it more often swings.' It may seriously be doubted whether entrusting the jury with law-dispensing powers is justified. While flexibility of legal administration is desirable, it would seem that the necessary 140 It may be doubted, however, whether the judges have done any better. Nonetheless, Chafee concludes that, on the whole, " [t] Rev. 36, 147 (1930) .
• 1 Consult Chafee, op. cit. supra note 138, at 529-540; Comment, Literary Obscenity in New York, 47 Col. L. Rev. 686 (1947) .
143Some of the more enthusiastic espousers of the jury, however, favor discrimination: "My uncle used to say. that the jury served the great purpose of ridding the neighborhood of its sons of bitches. Men have been convicted of murder in a jury's exercise of this function. ... [Tlhe jury sits in judgment on the offender as well as the offense.... My uncle was undoubtedly right in thinking that the jury often, and not always unjustifiably, confuses what a man is with what a man does." Curtis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 157. The probability that many jurors fail to grasp the significance of the court's instructions and even, in many cases, to comprehend the complex factual issues submitted to them for decision, instead of encouraging a sense of community responsibility, might be expected to derogate from it. Removing jurors from their private jobs and forcing them to assume heavy economic sacrifices in order to sit in judgment before issues which some of them cannot even understand can only encourage disrespect for the law. Finally, many jurors do not want the kind of education that jury service is claimed to provide. The costs are too great in relation to what is learned. Resultant attempts to secure exemption from service are widespread. Jury service is familiarly regarded as irksome. Unfortunately, there can be little doubt that many judges have exhibited bias and that some judges are corrupt.' Perhaps to some extent juries have functioned as a counteracting force. But the ultimate answer to judicial bias and corruption is not more juries, but better judges. Furthermore, those instances in which judges are likely to be biased and corrupt are often cases in which the jury would be powerless to act if it would. The corrupt or biased judge directs verdicts or rules at odds with the law on questions such as the admissibility of testimony; or the jury's verdict may be set aside as against the weight of the evidence; or the judge may declare himself in error on a previous legal ruling and direct a new trial. Even in those instances where the jury could act to thwart illicit judicial sympathies, the judge's prejudice, rather than being counterbalanced by the jury, may be complemented by it. Either the jury may be biased in the first place, or the judge, with a know-how born of experience, may render it so. Finally, the prejudice problem, while troublesome in the case of judges, is far more pronounced in the case of juries. Typically, the judge restrains the jury, not the other way around.
In one rather large body of cases, however, the jury may operate as a significant mainstay' against judicial bias and corruption. In criminal M6 While there is little direct evidence on this point, this is certainly the inference to be drawn from the frequent attempts of organized groups to secure legislative exemption for their members. [Vol. 21 cases, judges often acquire a vested interest in law enforcement; continuance in office often turns on the number of convictions which can be paraded before an electorate. The judge's friend and fellow political worker is often the prosecuting attorney or one of his subordinates or, on the other hand, the defendant's attorney. Similar considerations may produce undue judicial sympathy for one of the litigants in civil proceedings. In all of these cases, the jury is often a definite social asset. Significantly, however, most of the instances mentioned stem from the circumstance that judges are elected, often for short terms and subject to recall.
16-
66 Federal judges are not nearly so suspectible to influences which juries are in a position to correct, even if it is assumed that they would wish to.
Probably society does not take with any great degree of seriousness the claim that juries can successfully counteract judicial bias. In criminal cases, the judge's bias is most frequently reflected in the severity of his sentences, not in the manner he conducts the trial.
16 7 A jury wishing to counteract this severity can only acquit. If an attempt is made to secure a definite indication of the degree of punishment to be imposed, reversible error will almost automatically result.
16 8 Yet we are afraid to bestow sentencing powers upon juries, both for fear of their abuse and of the jury's inability to consider questions of punishment apart from those involving guilt. 69 It is only in a very narrow area in which the jury can ever successfully function as a device for thwarting judicial bias or corruption.
VIII. OTHER FUNcTIoNs oF THE JuRy
In addition to the more or less important tasks the jury is claimed to discharge, numerous incidental functions are also allegedly performed by it. Most of these alleged incidental functions, however, are but fictions devised by advocates of the jury system in order to bolster their main arguments.
Perhaps the most significant of these claims is the claim that the jury provides a means by which judges can avoid deciding complex questions and thus avoid the criticism which always follows from being forced to decide between two equally plausible alternatives. Judges should be men of 167 See Gaudet, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges (1938) . This study was conducted under the supervision of Professor Karl Llewellyn.
168 Foran exhaustive consideration of the problems involved, see Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 400 (1949) .
"I Other possible reasons are: (1) we wish to give the sentencing power to judges because of their superior experience, or to parole boards for similar reasons; or (2) we wish to keep the sentencing power in the hands of one upon whom public opinion can focus. dignity; to force them to guess and rationalize about facts encourages disrespect both -for themselves and the entire legal system.1 70 Significantly, perhaps, most of the outspoken defenders of the jury are trial judges.'
This argument is really but a variation of the theme that the jury supplies legal certainty and that a fiction about the ease with which facts can be decided is desirable in itself.
7 2 Many of the criticisms offered in refutation of the claim that the jury provides legal certainty are equally applicable to the contention that the jury assists judges to maintain proper respect for themselves.
7 3
In addition, as judge Frank has pointed out, "Men fit to be trial judges should be able and willing to accept public criticism. Moreover, they are obliged to do so in the many cases they must try without juries. Probably ... [the argument that the jury acts as an insulator against public criticism of the judge] is but an ingenious rationalization.' 1 74
It has also been urged that the jury offers an excellent form of popular entertainment which incidentally encourages citizens to take a more active interest in programs calculated to prevent crime. There is, however, no necessary connection between entertainment interest in jury trials and programs calculated to prevent crime; indeed, it might be expected that the result of watching at least some trials would produce an opposite effect. Trial before a judge sitting without a jury, while not as entertaining, possesses far more of the qualities which induce interest in crime prevention. Furthermore, the jury trial is a highly expensive form of entertainment, 1 5 and there is no reason why particular litigants should be expected to foot the community's entertainment bill. The drama popularly associated with the jury is also occasionally urged as being responsible for attracting into the legal profession its most able and distinguished members. It is more than likely, however, that jury trials have discouraged more able men from entering the law than they have encouraged. Exhibitionistic lawyers gesticulating before juries are often the greatest actors in the world, but may not be the best men safely and conscientiously to handle other persons' affairs. The emotionalism attendant upon jury trials has an even more undesirable effect upon the 170 E.g., Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra note 9, at 157. 17 Concededly, however, this fact cuts more than one way. [Vol. 21 THE FUNCTIONS OF THE JURY legal profession. 7 6 As Professor Thayer has observed, the jury trial "appears to... be a potent cause of demoralization to the bar."' 1 77 Crying, pleading and weeping before juries is not attractive to most lawyers and contributes heavily to the impression, often expressed, that "they are all shysters."
Finally, it has even been claimed that the jury trial operates as a preventer of litigation and the facilitator of compromise 78 Briefly, the contention is that the outcome of a jury trial is so uncertain and hinges upon such a multitude of imponderables that litigants, rather than risking a complete loss, will compose their differences out of court. But the coerced compromise of valid claims is not desirable, and to the extent that the aberrations of jurors are responsible, such compromises are unjustified. Many of the compromises for which the jury system is to blame, however, are not chargeable to any particular jury. The vast web of evidential rules, the trial judge's instructions upon the law, errors in the composition and selection of the jury, and a host of other sources of error necessitated by the jury system offer added inducement to compromise. Congested court dockets and resultant delays ih the ultimate decision of controversies furnish a still additional reason for settlement. Much of this congestion is due to the jury trial. The familiar claim that juries are plaintiff-prone may well be counterbalanced by the money insurance companies save by forcing 17 And also, of course, on the trial itself. There is little doubt that lawyers are motivated to "show-off" orbe dramatic in jury trials. Green, Judge and Jury 397 (1930). Green's observations were just recently corroborated by the results of the Missouri Law School experiments. See Hoffman and Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rev. 235, 246 (1952) .
The inherently competitive courtroom atmosphere, accentuated by the presence of jurors, is largely responsible for the belief that the jury often tries the lawyers rather than the issues. This belief is also fortified by the Missouri experiments. "[Seventy-five per cent] of those who thought there was any difference in the ability of counsel voted for the side represented by the attorney they would hire." Ibid., at 243.
177 Quoted by Frank, Courts on Trial 124 (1949). The inability of lawyers to predict the outcome of litigation also affords a convenient self-rationalizing device for the adoption of illegal practices calculated to secure victory.
178 A related argument, suggested by Curtis, is that jury verdicts reduce the number of appeals and hence save litigation expense. As contrasted with the findings of the trial judge, appellate court doctrines afford greater weight to a general verdict. Curtis argues that the rationale underlying this difference is found in the similarity'of training between trial and appellate court judges. The layman's judgment, being the result of disciplines (or, it may be, lack of disciplines) with which appellate judges are unfamiliar, must be accorded greater respect. Even assuming that Curtis' suggested rationale is correct, the thrust of his observation goes both ways: erroneous jury verdicts will be sustained where they should be reversed.
Probably, however, the rationale underlying the added respect appellate courts pay to jury as contrasted with trial-judge verdicts lies in the requirement that trial judges must make specific findings of fact. Knowing what has occurred, appellate courts are then in a position to act. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases Where Juries Are Waived, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 218 (1937) ; Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, op. cit. supra note 9, at 158 n. 16. harsh settlements upon injured persons in need of money to pay doctor bills.
17
Sophisticated canonizing of juror inefficiency has a slightly different basis in criminal as contrasted with civil cases. The widespread feeling that juries in criminal cases are defendant-prone, frequently acquitting for reasons the law cannot recognize and sociologists cannot even understand, coupled with the notion that everyone is a potential defendant induces respect for inefficiency. 80 As pointed out above, 181 however, defendants need protection against unjust convictions quite as much as society requires the conviction and punishment of those who have committed crimes. It is doubtful, however, whether popular theories concerning the leniency of criminal juries are justified. In any event, the notion that the jury is good because of its refusal to do what it is legally supposed to, and because we respect inefficiency, is wholly irrational.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is doubtful whether the jury has fulfilled the expectations which the innumerable functions claimed for it seem to portend. This would seem true not only of the strictly legal tasks which have been assigned to it, but of its so-called "incidental" and "extra-legal" functions as well. Concededly, however, there is an element of fraud involved in any attempt to appraise the jury system's efficiency. In the absence of empirical data, value judgments all too readily creep in to substitute for facts. Value judgments, however, do not constitute the basis for the inconsistencies found in the functions ascribed to the jury and in the numerous rules governing their performance. Illicitly expecting the jury to do one thing while legally charging it with doing the opposite, and formulating rules so that neither expectation nor legal duty can successfully be realized, are alone sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the jury. Suggestions cohcerning the extent to which the law of the jury should be changed, however, are beyond this article's province. Empirical investigation may demonstrate that the conclusions arrived at here are to some extent unsupported in fact, and that certain of the inconsistencies between the functions imputed to the jury and the rules guiding their execution are possibly superficial. 
